Neorealism and Its Unfair Critics

Neorealist arguments get misrepresented much more frequently than any other theories’ arguments, and neorealism regularly gets attacked on unfair grounds. In any good scientific environment critique is seen as something positive. But misrepresenting arguments is different: It is morally reprehensible and obstructive to scientific progress. I’d like to point out two examples.

In his famous and often cited article Anarchy is What States Make of It, Alexander Wendt claims that neorealism was incomplete: “Waltz’s three-part definition of structure (…) seems underspecified. In order to go from structure to action, we need to add a forth: the intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and interests in the system” (Wendt 1992: 401). Wendt argues that self-help and power politics do not follow logically or causally from anarchy (Wendt 1992: 394), and that foreign policy identities are  endogenously to the state system, contrary to what neorealism claims: “Waltz seems to think [that foreign interests are exogenously given] and proposes two mechanisms, competition and socialisation, by which structure conditions state action. The content about his conditioning, however, presupposes a self-help system that is not itself a constitutive feature of anarchy” (Wendt 1992: 402-403).

To be clear: I admire Wendt’s work, and think he did an amazing job in bringing IR theory forward. But the statement that neorealism is underspecified is not more than a misrepresentation of neorealism – and I can not imagine that Wendt was not aware of that. Neorealism claims that because intentions are unclear and subject to change, foreign policy can not be based on them. Instead, regardless of a states intentions, it’s material capabilities are a good measure of how dangerous it is or may be in the future. Neorealism’s emphasis of material capabilities thus does not derive from the neglect of intentions, but from the emphasis of uncertainty about the present and future intentions of other states. It is this uncertainty that makes the levels and trends in relative power such a fundamental causal variable (Copeland 2000: 188). Relative power considerations, in turn, lead to power politics. Ironically, it is the very possibility that foreign policies change, as emphasised by Wendt, that pressures responsible leaders to focus on relative capabilities and engage in the great power game.

If we agree with neorealism or not is one question, but to give it a fair treatment when criticising it is another. Neorealism is not underspecified just because Wendt does not agree with its conclusions. This is the most serious misrepresentation of realist arguments known to me.

Robert O. Keohane is another example of a scholar that attacks neorealism with unfair means. Although he does not misrepresent neorealism in a narrow sense, he attacks it on unfair grounds. Keohane consistently claims that he bases his theory on neorealism and is simply advancing it. In 1995, he emphasises this nicely: “By seeking to specify the conditions under which institutions can have an impact and cooperation can occur, institutionalist theory shows under what conditions realist propositions are valid. It is in this sense that institutionalist claims subsume realism” (Keohane 1995: 42; see also Keohane 1984: 29). But at the very beginning of his well-known and even-better-received After Hegemony, Keohane writes: “This book is about how cooperation has been, and can be, organised in the world of political economy when common interests exist. (…) The theory that I develop takes the existence of mutual interests as given. (…) Because I begin with acknowledged common interests, my study focuses on relations among the advanced market-economy countries (…)” (Keohane 1984: 6).  This reveals a major flaw in Keohane’s reasoning: Neorealism is not about political economy, but about international security. It is interested in peace and war in international history. Because it focuses on international security, neorealism claims that states seek relative gains, not absolute gains: “A state worries about a division of possible gains that may favour others more than itself” (Waltz 1979: 106; there is also a vast literature on absolute and relative gains). So Keohane makes a very nice argument about international cooperation – but sells it as a challenge to neorealism it isn’t. Keohane does not even base his theory on the same assumptions. In fact, neorealism does not differ in its analysis of international cooperation in the case that absolute gains (would) exist. Neoliberal institutionalism is no alternative to neorealism, but has been swallowed up by it (Mearsheimer 1995: 85).

How can we explain that neorealism gets such an unfair treatment? (Neo-)realism still is the dominant theory of international relations. Although this is not at all true for Europe (Mearsheimer 2005), it is for the United States. Additionally, there is a liberal and constructivist trend in the IR literature. Liberals started neglecting realism’s relevance after the end of the Cold War. At around the same time, constructivism gained in importance. Thus, in combination, there simply are a whole lot of scholars writing against realism – and some of them seem to do it for the sake of it, attacking a realism that doesn’t even exist. Pragmatic arguments seem not to sell very good, so scholars feel driven to blow their arguments up. Instead of selling them for what they are, they create artificial theoretical stand-offs to make themselves heard.

To any serious student of international politics it should be clear that although there is a lot of change in the international system, there is some continuity, as well: states are not as important as some decades ago – but still the most important actors in international politics. Security is not as scarce as before – but still scarce and subject to relative power considerations and change. And so on. Sure, theoretical debates have to be abstract and very specific, so we will always have to distinguish one theory from another, thereby emphasising the differences between them. But we should not become obsessed with that. What we need is a more pragmatic scholarship that is not just focused on theoretical details, but tries to explain the real world.

Literature

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- Copeland, Dale C. 2000. “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay.” International Security 25(2): 187-212.
- Keohane , Robert O. 1984. After Hegemony. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Keohane, Robert O. and Lisa L. Martin. 1995. “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory.” International Security 20(1): 39-51.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 1995. “A Realist Reply.” International Security 20(1): 82-93.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 2005. “E.H. Carr vs. Idealism: The Battle Rages On.” International Relations 19(2): 39-52.
- Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” International Organization 46(2): 391-425.

(Originally published on September 3, 2009)

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